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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium offers a welcome opportunity to consider an important
topic with many facets.
As suggested by my title, the term
overcriminalization is broad enough to cover laws imposing penal
sanctions on conduct that should be solely a matter of individual morality.1
It also includes legislation that criminalizes relatively trivial conduct, such
as removing the tag on a mattress,2 which should be dealt with by civil
provisions, or perhaps left to the good sense of the individual. Many argue
that a good deal of so-called regulatory or “white collar crime” should fall
outside the ambit of the criminal law, to be dealt with by other bodies of
specialized civil law, such as corporate governance, environmental, or
election finance law.3 Another facet of overcriminalization is the enormous
expansion of federal criminal law to cover subjects that were previously the
exclusive province of state law.4 My purpose in this Essay is to explore
1. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 159-65 (1967) (articulating the view that policing of morals stifles the
legitimacy of the law because such laws are largely unenforced, selectively utilized to
punish other unrelated conduct, and involve diversion of scarce police resources).
2. As Stuart Green explains, consumers actually face no liability for removing tags.
The regulations pertain to sellers. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag
Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 (1997).
3. For particularly helpful discussions, see Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White
Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 502 (2004) (arguing
that crimes such as bribery, extortion, fraud, and other regulatory crimes are unlike
traditional crimes which are unequivocally immoral); Green, supra note 1; Sanford H.
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425 (1963) (questioning the use of criminal sanctions
in the larger scheme of economic policy formulation); PAUL ROSENZWEIG, THE HERITAGE
LEGAL FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM, THE OVER-CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONDUCT (Apr. 17, 2003) (critiquing the shift in justification for criminal
punishment from moral to utilitarian, resulting in non-traditional punishment for acts that
are
not
morally
wrong
or
are
merely
negligent),
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm7.cfm. But see Kip Schlegel, David Eitle
& Steven Gunkel, Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 140 (20002001) (undertaking a study of securities violations from 1984 to 1991 to conclude that there
is no empirical support for the position that business regulatory offenses are
overcriminalized).
4. For a discussion of the problems of overfederalization, see John S. Baker, Jr., State
Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 712 (1999)
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some common features connecting the different forms of
overcriminalization, as well as some of the distinct aspects of each. I will
also touch on the related but distinct crisis of our country’s unprecedented
and unjustifiably high rate of incarceration.
Although morals legislation and the extension of federal criminal law
into areas traditionally reserved to the states, such as street crime, might
seem to bear little relationship to one another, I will argue that they reveal
many of the same vices of overcriminalization. I will argue that the
common features of overcriminalization include the following: (1)
excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable
disparity among similarly situated persons, (3) potential for abuse by
enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other significant values
and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of scarce
resources (opportunity costs). Part I of this Essay sets the stage, describing
the existing state morals laws and the breathtakingly broad scope of
contemporary federal criminal law.
Part II explores the harmful
consequences—what I call the vices—of vestigial morals legislation and
the expanded body of federal criminal law, beginning with descriptions of
particular state and federal prosecutions, and then broadening the analysis
to the broader themes reflected in these cases. Part II then turns to a
discussion of the proper scope of federal criminal law in light of the vices
of overcriminalization, and concludes with a series of questions about the
application of the analysis advanced in this Essay to regulatory offenses.

(examining the expansion of federal criminal law from the perspective of the states); Sara
Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995) (arguing that increase
in federal prosecutions overloads the federal courts and inevitably results in unjustified
sentencing disparities between offenders in federal and state courts); Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135,
1136 (1995) (espousing the view that the continued expansion of federal criminal law
cannot be reconciled with principals of federalism); Stephen Chippendale, Note, More
Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 467
(1994) (assessing the growth of federal criminal law, and arguing that such growth increases
costs without decreasing crime and harms the function of the federal courts); Susan R.
Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1591 (2002)
(distinguishing issues raised by two forms of federalization: decentralization federalism and
independent norm federalism); James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law:
Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. L. REP.
(providing comprehensive report on federalization of crime as well as extensive
bibliography). But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 250 (1997) (arguing that the share of federal criminal law
is actually empirically decreasing, and that crimes such as street crime should be subject to
expanding federal prescription).
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SETTING THE STAGE: THE STATES RETAIN LAWS REGULATING
MORALS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CRIMINALIZES
VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING
A. State Morals Legislation: Old Laws That Stay on the Books

One form of overcriminalization is the retention of crimes beyond the
time that they serve an important social purpose, particularly when the laws
deal with conduct that is common and innocuous. Laws restricting
behavior on Sundays,5 and prohibiting swearing6 and spitting on the street7
5. The so-called “blue laws” have their origins in the Christian tradition of religious
worship on Sundays. Although the earliest versions of the blue laws required religious
observances on Sunday, these provisions were replaced with laws that prohibited various
activities to preserve Sundays as a day of rest. Many states retain a variety of restrictions on
Sunday activities. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-1 (2005) (prohibiting child, apprentice, or
servant labor on Sunday; making illegal shooting, hunting, gaming, card playing, or racing;
and forbidding the opening of stores, excluding pharmacies); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-2 (2005)
(prohibiting the opening of public markets and the trading or selling of goods and
merchandise, including livestock and cattle); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 136 § 57 (West
2005) (prohibiting hunting on Sundays); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 9 (McKinney 2005)
(restricting the sale of various items at particular times of day on Sunday). For a general
discussion of blue laws, see ALEXIS MCCROSSEN, HOLY DAY, HOLIDAY: THE AMERICAN
SUNDAY 1-7 (2000) (exploring the complex history of work and laws pertaining to Sunday,
including the transition from a day of work to the day of rest, the importance of religion, and
the conflicts between leisure, rest, and religion); Albert J. King, Sunday Law in the
Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675, 676-88 (2000) (recounting the slackening of
Sunday law prohibitions, including Sunday work laws, travel restrictions, and recreation
bans resulting from the steady erosion of the religious justification for such laws by the
courts); Marc A. Stadtmauer, Essay, Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws and
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214 (1994)
(discussing the history of New York blue laws and arguing that the few remaining New
York blue laws, such as Sunday closing laws, do not survive constitutional scrutiny).
The Supreme Court has generally rebuffed Establishment Clause challenges to the blue
laws, finding them to be valid exercises of the power to protect the public health and morals,
and reflecting the states’ legitimate concern with the health, safety, recreation, and general
well-being of their citizens. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1278-80 (2004) (utilizing the Sunday morals laws to argue
that lawmakers should always be required to ground their legislation in hard facts rather
than moral justifications).
6. A surprising number of jurisdictions retain criminal prohibitions against spitting,
swearing, and other similar activities. Some of the provisions regarding cursing or swearing
appear as part of provisions aimed at disturbing the peace. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 221307 (2005) (making it unlawful, inter alia, for anyone to curse, swear, or make use of any
profane language or indecent or obscene words, or engage in any disorderly conduct in a
wide variety of public places).
Other provisions prohibiting swearing or profanity in public are much more clearly
morals legislation. Some states prohibit swearing or profanity in any public place. See, e.g.,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (2004) (prohibiting profane swearing or cursing, or use of
vulgar or indecent language, in any public place in the presence of two or more persons);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (Michie 2004) (prescribing profane cursing or swearing in
public); W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 61-8-15 (2004) (regulating profane cursing or swearing in
public). Other states have bans that, on their face, apply to behavior wherever it occurs. For
example, a Michigan provision states that “[a]ny person who has arrived at the age of
discretion, who shall profanely curse or damn or swear by the name of God, Jesus Christ or
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exemplify this problem. A significant number of states retain criminal laws
dealing with these kinds of conduct.8 Because of the evolution of the social
conventions regarding sexual morality, criminal laws that regulated
traditional morality now pose many of the same issues. The regulation of
morals was originally a major component of American criminal law,9 but
over the past half century these provisions have been eliminated in many
states. The dominant view today, championed by the drafters of the Model
Penal Code, is that sexual chastity and fidelity within marriage should be
treated as matters of private morality, not enforced by laws criminalizing
fornication, cohabitation, and adultery.10
Despite the contemporary view that sexual morality should not be
regulated by the criminal law, a surprisingly large number of states have
the Holy Ghost, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.103
(West 2004). Oklahoma defines and punishes both blasphemy and profane swearing as
misdemeanors. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 901-905 (2004). There, blasphemy is defined as
“wantonly uttering or publishing words, casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule
upon God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Holy Scriptures or the Christian or any other
religion.” tit. 21, § 901. Oklahoma state law contains a defense for cases where it appears
beyond reasonable doubt that the words complained of were used in the course of serious
discussion, and with intent to make known or recommend opinions entertained by the
accused. tit. 21, § 902. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-11-5 (2004) (enacting a general
prohibition on profane swearing and cursing). It seems obvious that many of these statutes
could be challenged on First Amendment grounds, which might provoke controversies like
those currently being litigated regarding public displays of the Ten Commandments. See
Christal Hoo, Thou Shalt Not Publicly Display the Ten Commandments: A Call for a
Reevaluation of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 683, 694
(2004) (exploring alternative approaches to Establishment Clause jurisprudence as applied
to the display of the Ten Commandments in federal courthouses).
7. Although many states prohibit spitting on sidewalks and other public places, these
provisions may be thought of as public health provisions rather than morals offenses. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-120 (2004) (prohibiting spitting on public transportation); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1121 (West 2004) (sanctioning spitting in or on certain public
places); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 14 (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:18
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-322 (Michie 2004); cf. Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health
and Law: Past and Future Vision, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 525, 527 n.9 (2003)
(referring to successful public health educational campaigns seeking to discourage public
spitting on the streets).
8. See supra notes 6-7 (listing statutes outlawing profanity and expectoration).
9. For a general historical discussion, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993). A discussion of morals elements is interwoven
throughout, but Lawrence=s discussion of the early colonial period and various anti-vice
movements is particularly pertinent. See id. at 32-36, 54, and 125-48.
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980). The commentary to the Model Penal Code, in the course of discussing the rationale
for including no provisions on consensual sodomy, states:
The criminal law cannot encompass all behavior that the average citizen may
regard as immoral or deviate . . . . Verbal cruelty, lying, racial and religious biases
in private relationships, and the kiss that betrays a marriage are but a few of the
examples of reprehensible conduct no sensible legislator would make into a crime.
Id. at 370. In support of this position, the comments cite the practical consideration that
“[e]conomic resources are finite” and should be reserved for more serious offenses,
particularly given the difficulty of investigating and proving consensual offenses, as well as
the broader objection to the exercise of the state’s coercive power to maintain the majority’s
notion of morality or acceptable behavior. Id. at 370-71.
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not repealed laws regulating sexual morality. Approximately one fourth of
the states, and the District of Columbia, retain laws making fornication and
cohabitation a crime,11 and about half of the states, and the military, make
adultery a crime.12 Other state laws regulate the commercialization of sex,
prohibiting prostitution and related activities.13 The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas14 raises the issue of whether some or
11. See Melanie C. Falco, Comment, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth
Amendment to Strike Down Criminal Punishment For Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts,
82 N.C. L. REV. 723, 738 (2004) (listing Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2003)),
Illinois (ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (2003)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272 § 18 (West 2003)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003)), North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2003)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (2003)),
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-104 (2003)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 2003)), and West Virginia
(W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (2003)) along with the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 221602 (2001)) as states that still make fornication illegal).
12. See id. (identifying statutes from Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2000))
and Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 2003)) that make cohabitation a
crime); id. at 744 (listing statutes from Alabama (ALA. CODE 13A-13-2 (2002)), Arizona
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-1408 (2003)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. 18-6-501 (2002)), Florida
(FLA. STAT. ANN. 798.01 (West 2003)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. 16-6-19 (2003)), Idaho
(IDAHO CODE 18-6601 (Michie 2003)), Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West
2002)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3507 (2001)), Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
272, 14 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 750.30 (West 2003)),
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. 609.36 (West 2003)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. 97-29-1
(2003)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 645.3 (2003)), New York (N.Y. Penal Law
255.17 (McKinney 2002)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-184 (2001)), North Dakota
(N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-09 (2003)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 871 (West
2002)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-6-2 (2002)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. 1615-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-103 (2003)), Virginia (VA. CODE
ANN. 18.2-365 (Michie 2003)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. 61-8-3 (Michie 2003)),
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. 944.16 (West Supp. 2002)) and the District of Columbia (D.C.
CODE ANN. 22-201 (2001)) that make adultery a crime, and providing source material on the
military law definition of adultery as an offense). See also Traci Sheallbetter Stratton, Note,
No More Messing Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting
Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 767 n.2 (1998) (confirming the above list of states that
make adultery a crime).
13. All U.S. states criminalize exchanging sex for money (with limited exceptions in
Nevada), and many states also criminalize adjunct activities such as pimping, keeping a
place of prostitution, or paying for sex. See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond
Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 530 (2000), citing JOHN F. DECKER,
PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 81 (1979). Decker notes that prostitution was
not a crime at common law, and accordingly statutory definitions vary. For examples of
state laws, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (2005) (“A person is guilty of
prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for a fee.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(a) (2004) (“Any person
who performs, offers or agrees to perform any act of sexual penetration . . . for any money,
property, token, object, or article or anything of value, or any touching or fondling of the sex
organs of one person by another person, for any money, property, token, object, or article or
anything of value, for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification commits an act of
prostitution.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (2004) (“The term ‘prostitution’ shall be
construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire, and
shall also be construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for indiscriminate
sexual intercourse without hire.”).
14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied
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all of these statutes violate the constitutional right to liberty. Because
courts have not yet ruled on the applicability of Lawrence to these
provisions, I assume their continued validity for purposes of this
discussion.
B. Federal Criminal Law: Many New Laws and Many More
Prosecutions
In one sense, federal criminal law poses quite a contrast to state morals
legislation, which is clearly on the decline. It is extremely difficult to say
how many federal crimes there are; the best current estimate is over
4,000.15 Whatever the precise number, the number of federal crimes and
the number of federal prosecutions have skyrocketed.16 Different measures
have been suggested to gauge the growth in offenses. A blue ribbon ABA
task force found that more than forty percent of federal criminal provisions
passed after the Civil War had been enacted in the twenty-eight year period
between 1970 and 1998.17 A detailed study commissioned by the
Federalist Society concluded that there had been a thirty percent increase in
federal offenses carrying criminal penalties between 1980 and 2004.18
As a result of the recent legislation, the bulk of federal criminal
provisions now deal with conduct also subject to the states’ general police
powers. As I have explained elsewhere:
Dual federal-state criminal jurisdiction is now the rule rather than the
exception. Federal law reaches at least some instances of each of the
following state offenses: theft, fraud, extortion, bribery, assault,
domestic violence, robbery, murder, weapons offenses, and drug
offenses. In many instances, federal law overlaps almost completely

to adult males who had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of a home).
15. See JOHN S. BAKER, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME
LEGISLATION 3 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practice
groupnewsletters/criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf. One of the problems is that multiple
crimes are typically stated in the same section, and it can be very difficult to determine how
many different offenses are actually created by a single section. See id. at 7-8. Another
problem is finding all of the relevant sections. Although many criminal statutes are
gathered in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the remainder are scattered throughout the other fifty
titles, which encompass more than 27,000 pages. Ronald Gainer, Federal Criminal Code
Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 46, 53 (1998). Many of these statutory
provisions incorporate by reference administrative regulations (and may punish as crimes,
for example, willful violations). According to American Bar Association, there are almost
10,000 such administrative regulations that may be subject to criminal enforcement.
Strazzella, supra note 4, at 10.
16. See BAKER, supra note 15, at 3 (aggregating studies from 1970 forward indicating
the “explosive growth” of federal crime prosecution).
17. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 7. The Task Force Report contains an extensive
bibliography of articles, books, and reports dealing with the federalization of crime. Id. at
59-77
18. BAKER, supra note 15, at 3.
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with state law, as is the case with drug offenses.19

This movement toward concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over
most offenses is a sharp break from the traditional view of the federal
system. The traditional view derives both from the historical fact that
federal jurisdiction was extremely limited for most of the nation’s history20
and from the structure of the constitutional system. Unlike the states,
whose plenary powers include police powers that extend to all forms of
criminal activity, the federal government has no general authority over
crime.21 All federal criminal legislation must be founded on one or more of
the powers delegated to the federal government, such as the postal power,22
the power to collect taxes,23 and the power to regulate immigration.24
Although the federal government’s role in combating crime evolved as
Congress employed its delegated powers and enacted criminal sanctions as
one means of effectuating those powers,25 it remained the general rule that
garden variety crime was the province of the states, not the federal
government.26 The unprecedented expansion of the federal criminal code
in recent years is difficult to square with the traditional view of the
respective federal and state roles. As the ABA noted, “the fundamental
view that local crime is, with rare exception, a matter for the states to attack
has been strained in practice in recent years.”27
Moreover, both the number of federal defendants and the number of
federal criminal cases have increased dramatically. As shown in the table
below,28 between 1980 and 2003 the number of cases and defendants in the
federal system had more than doubled, with the number of criminal cases
increasing 240% and the number of criminal defendants increasing 230%.
19. Beale, supra note 4, at 997-98 (citations omitted).
20. For a general account of the historical development of federal criminal law, see Sara
Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 694
(2d ed. 2002).
21. The Constitution explicitly authorizes federal jurisdiction over only a handful of
crimes: counterfeiting, crimes against the law of nations, treason, and crimes committed on
the high seas (such as piracy). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 10 (piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations);
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (treason). These offenses concern matters, such as foreign
relations, over which the federal government has exclusive authority.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 7 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish
Post Offices and post Roads . . . .”).
23. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To lay and collect
Taxes . . . .”).
24. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”).
25. See Beale, supra note 20, at 695-98 (tracing the progression of federal criminal law
expansion post-Civil War and post-prohibition).
26. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting the historical
exclusivity of states’ criminal law enforcement).
27. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 5.
28. Source of data: Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 3.1, available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.01.pdf.
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Fiscal Year

Criminal Cases

Criminal Defendants

1980

29,387

39,914

1990

48,035

65,855

2000

62,745

83,963

2003

70,642

92,714
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The increase in drug and firearms cases has been especially steep. Drug
cases have grown from 3,130 in 1980 to 11,520 in 2003, and firearms cases
have increased from 931 prosecutions in 1980 to 3,620 in 2003.29
Federal criminal law is a rapidly growing hodgepodge. It retains the
traditional crimes that protect governmental functions, personnel and
property, such as tax fraud, theft of government property, and interference
with government functions and programs by bribing a federal official or
obstructing justice. But it also contains what some have called the crime
du jour—legislation drafted in response to whatever crime is the focal point
in the media—even if that offense is already defined and punished harshly
and effectively under state law. For example, a high profile carjacking in a
suburb near Washington, D.C.,30 led to the rapid enactment of a federal
carjacking statute.31 The passage of the federal law was not a response to
any gap in either state law or the state enforcement system: the
perpetrators of the publicized offense were apprehended, convicted, and
sentenced to life imprisonment for murder.32 Other new federal laws have
29. Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 3.02, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judicialfactsfigures/table3.02.pdf.
30. The victim was Dr. Pamela Basu, whose twenty-month-old baby was in her car
when gunmen ordered her out. When she attempted to save her child she became tangled in
the seatbelt and was dragged for more than a mile. Realizing that Dr. Basu was still
connected to the car, her assailants tried to dislodge her body by sideswiping a fence, and
they threw the baby onto the road. Although the child was unhurt, Basu died of internal
injuries. F. Georgann Wing, Putting the Brakes on Carjacking or Accelerating It? The Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 385, 390-91 & n.43 (1994).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2005) (“Whoever takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so . . . .”).
Similar legislation has been enacted in other states as well. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
812.133 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-2 (Burns 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-117
(1994).
32. Wing, supra note 31, at 390-91. Although both defendants in the Basu case were
convicted of murder under Maryland law, the Maryland legislature also enacted carjacking
legislation in response to the Basu case. See The Maryland Survey: 1998-1999, 59 MD. L.
REV. 908, 908 n.5 (describing the legislative history of emergency legislation codified as
MD CODE, Criminal Law, § 3-405).
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dealt with a wide variety of conduct, including the failure to pay child
support,33 disruptive conduct by animal rights activists,34 creating, selling
or possessing depictions of cruelty to animals,35 and female genital
mutilation.36
These new federal criminal laws do not preempt state criminal laws.
Rather, they create a scheme of dual or concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction.
II. WHY IT MATTERS: THE VICES OF MORALS LEGISLATION AND TOO
MANY FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
In order to make the point that both of these forms of overcriminalization
create serious problems, and that they create many of the same kinds of
problems, I will begin by describing a few individual cases, some involving
morals legislation, and others federal crimes.
A. Amanda Smisek, Kobe Bryant, James Yee, and Morals Charges
The morals offenses are by no means a dead letter. First, surprising as it
might seem, prosecutions for violations of the remaining laws are
infrequent, but they do occur. Although there have been no prosecutions in
most states in recent years,37 that does not mean that individual prosecutors
may not adopt a more aggressive policy, as some have done in recent years.
For example, in the mid-1990s a prosecutor in Idaho charged Amanda
Smisek and her boyfriend with criminal fornication; Ms. Smisek, a high
school junior whose grades were As and Bs, was convicted six days before
she gave birth.38 The same prosecutor charged seven other pregnant girls
and their boyfriends with criminal fornication.39 A few years earlier,
women in Connecticut and Wisconsin were charged with criminal
adultery.40 In the Wisconsin case, the charges carried a maximum penalty
of two years in jail and a $10,000 fine; the woman was the first person
charged under the statute since 1888.41 More recently, military prosecutors
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 228, 3563(B)(21) (2005).
34. Id. § 43.
35. Id. § 48.
36. Id. § 116.
37. Cathryn Donohoe, Adultery: It’s Not Just a Sin, it’s a Crime, WASH. TIMES, June
29, 1990, at E1 (quoting an expert on Virginia family law who could recall no prosecution
for adultery in that state).
38. Heidi Meinzer, Idaho’s Throwback to Elizabethan England: Criminalizing a Civil
Proceeding, 34 FAM. L.Q. 165, 165 (2000).
39. Id.
40. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1 (describing charges leading to the arrest of
housewife Dawn Jakubowski of Norwich, Connecticut, and Donna Carroll of Ashland,
Wisconsin).
41. Id. The district attorney agreed to dismiss the case in exchange for the wife’s
agreement to do community service and take parental counseling. Id.
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charged both Air Force pilot Lt. Kelly Flinn, the first woman to fly a B-52,
and Capt. James Yee, a Muslim chaplain at the Guantanamo Bay prison,
with adultery as well as other more serious charges.42
Although the scope of prosecutorial discretion is wide in every
jurisdiction, the existence of rarely-used statutes invites (if not demands)
selective enforcement and unequal treatment of similarly situated
defendants. There is no realistic possibility that all of the individuals who
might fall within the scope of the statute will be prosecuted. Statutes that
are applied only rarely give prosecutors the extraordinary ability to single
out and punish one defendant, or perhaps a handful of defendants, for
conduct that is widespread.43 The prosecutor may do so for virtually any
reason. She might seek to enforce her own view of sexual morality or
proper social behavior, or she might have some other goal. The Idaho
prosecutor appears to have been concerned with the public fisc: the
majority of the girls were arrested after they applied for public assistance,44
and the prosecutor referred to the first girl he charged as a “disgruntled,
irresponsible teenager who [brings] something into this world that is going
to cost taxpayers a lot of money.”45 Both the Wisconsin and Connecticut
cases involved one additional element: a vengeful spouse who pressed
charges in the course of the breakup of her marriage.46
The use of these statutes is so rare that it brings to mind Justice Potter
Stewart’s memorable criticism of the death penalty as “so wantonly and so
42. See John Mintz, Army Drops Chaplain’s Court-Martial, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
2004, at A2 (noting that when Yee was detained officials said they were preparing charges
of espionage, sedition, and other charges that could have resulted in the death penalty,
though the charges actually filed were for mishandling classified papers, downloading
pornography, and having an adulterous affair with a female officer). Eventually the
government dismissed its court-martial proceedings, dropping these charges and sending
Yee to an administrative proceeding in which he will be offered non judicial punishment.
Id. Flinn was charged with adultery, insubordination, and lying; her case ended with her
accepting a general discharge rather than being court-martialed. Id. Flinn, who was not
married, reportedly had an affair with a married civilian man. Richard Cohen, Snooping on
Soldiers, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at A23. It should be noted that under military law
adultery is not a standalone offense; rather, it is punishable only when it is shown to have
been prejudicial to good order and discipline. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2005). However, such
charges are apparently far from rare. The Air Force alone reportedly conducted sixty-seven
courts martial for adultery in 1997. Cohen, supra.
43. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2004) (requiring proof of only two
elements by prosecutors: nonmarital status and intercourse for a fornication offense—a very
easy burden to satisfy).
44. Meinzer, supra note 38, at 166.
45. Id. at 171 (quoting Gem County prosecutor Douglas Varie). The sentence included
elements that could improve the mother’s parenting skills as well as her job prospects.
Amanda Smisek was given a suspended sentence of one month’s juvenile detention and
three years probation contingent on her staying in school, keeping her waitressing job, and
attending parenting classes. Id. at 167. In England, in contrast, the enforcement of the
fornication statutes was concerned with the problem of fixing paternity and providing for
the support of illegitimate children. Id. at 166-68.
46. Donohoe, supra note 37.
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freakishly imposed,” that it was like being hit by lightning.47 It is also
reminiscent of the problems posed by overbroad statutes dealing with
loitering and similar forms of behavior. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,48 and reiterated in more recent
cases such as Kolender v. Lawson49 and Morales v. City of Chicago,50
statutes that are vague and overbroad delegate so much discretion to the
police and prosecutors that they invite arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Provisions that by their nature cannot or will not be generally
enforced invite prosecutorial conduct that is at best arbitrary and at worst
discriminatory.
The statutes also invite use as a pretext. For example, fornication can be
charged along with other more serious forcible offenses. Charges of
fornication and other prohibited sexual practices have been used as a
backup in rape cases in which the proof of force or lack of consent may not
be sufficient.51 This strategy works equally well whether the case is
submitted to a jury52 or the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offense.53
47. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Similarly, Justice White added “that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at
313 (White, J., concurring).
48. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The Court struck down a vagrancy ordinance as void for
vagueness because it did not afford fair notice. Id. at 161.
49. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The Court nullified a California loitering statute due to
vagueness because the statute did not adequately define its identification requirements. Id.
at 355.
50. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). The Court found a Chicago “Gang Congregation Ordinance”
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds because it arbitrarily circumscribed loitering for
innocent purposes. Id. at 53-56.
51. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000) (finding a defendant not guilty
of rape but guilty of a crime against nature after the defendant denied victim’s allegation of
forced vaginal and anal intercourse, but admitted consensual oral sex, which does not
require proof of force or lack of consent); State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
(acquitting the defendant of rape, forcible sodomy, and burglary, but convicting of lesserincluded offenses of fornication, sodomy, and trespass). See generally Falco, supra note 11,
at 735-36 (recounting the use of fornication and sodomy laws to “obtain a legal advantage
for the state”); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on
Premarital and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1991) (providing
examples of using fornication statutes to prosecute suspected rapists and prostitutes). For a
particularly imaginative use of this technique, see In re N.A., 539 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (upholding a delinquency finding based upon a twelve-year-old girl’s commission of
the offense of fornication with older teenage boys, and rejecting the claim that the girl’s
status as a victim of statutory rape should preclude charging her with fornication in a
delinquency proceeding).
52. See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the pretextual use of
statutes in Smith and Houston to obtain jury convictions on lesser charges where the juries
found insufficient evidence to convict on more serious charges, such as rape); State v.
Spanbauer, 322 N.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming a jury’s conviction of
a defendant—charged with sexual assault of two victims—of one count of a lesser degree of
sexual assault, and one count of fornication).
53. See Richard Green, Griswold’s Legacy: Fornication and Adultery As Crimes, 16
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1989) (quoting the commentary to the Alabama adultery
statute, which states that the offense “‘may prove useful on occasions, as for example in
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The impact of the addition of a fornication charge can be tremendous. If
the defendant claims that intercourse occurred but was consensual, as
National Basketball Association star Kobe Bryant did,54 this defense to
rape admits the lesser offense of fornication. Similarly, Army prosecutors
charged Captain James Yee with the minor offenses of adultery, possessing
pornography, and mishandling documents when they were unable to muster
sufficient evidence in support of the original allegations of espionage and
sedition, offenses punishable by death.55 The adultery charge was a
particularly potent weapon and potential bargaining chip because Yee is a
Muslim chaplain and his lover was questioned extensively at a hearing
attended by Yee’s wife.56
Finally, the morals statutes may be manipulated by third parties. In the
Connecticut and Wisconsin cases noted above, prosecutors acted at the
behest of the women’s estranged husbands.57 Moreover, the existence of
the criminal statutes, even where they are not enforced, can have important
secondary effects in the context of tort law, family law, and other civil
contexts.58 For example, one state court found its state law treatment of
premarital sex as criminal fornication relevant in denying a tort action for
herpes transmission.59 In another state, the illegal nature of the sexual
relations between unmarried persons was the basis for denying a parent
custody rights.60 The legislature in yet another state reportedly declined to
repeal its law criminalizing adultery after hearing “compelling testimony

plea bargaining’”).
54. See Bryant: ‘I Want to Apologize’ to the Young Woman, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 2004),
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/01/bryant.statement/index.html (on file with the
American University Law Review) (apologizing publicly for a sexual encounter with a hotel
employee, which Bryant claimed was consensual, but which resulted in charges of sexual
assault, later dropped by prosecutors).
55. See Mintz, supra note 42, at A2 (describing the military’s subsequent decision to
drop the charges of mishandling classified documents, possessing pornography, and
engaging in adultery and the referral of the pornography and adultery charges to nonjudicial administrative proceedings).
56. Id. See also Military Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A1 (editorial
criticizing military for its incompetent and mean-spirited prosecution and asking why
embarrassing sexual allegations were included in a case that was purportedly about national
security).
57. Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1.
58. On several of the points discussed, there are also state cases refusing to draw the
inferences discussed in the text. For a discussion of the cases from various jurisdictions, see
Hillary Greene, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in
Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174-80 (1997).
59. See Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) (applying the common law rule
that a person who freely engages in an illegal act may not recover damages from a coparticipant on claims resulting from that act); see also Greene, supra note 58, at 174-76
(discussing Zysk).
60. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 423-24 (Ill. 1979); accord Bottoms v. Bottoms,
457 S.E.2d 102, 107-08 (Va. 1995) (affirming award of custody to grandmother based upon
mother’s felonious sodomy).
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that it’s useful in divorce cases.”61 Other indirect consequences
unenforced morals statutes may include legitimating the refusal to rent
unmarried couples and providing a basis for the use of fornication
cohabitation as evidence of bad character in disciplinary proceedings
college or employment settings.62

of
to
or
in

B. James McFarland, Andre Curtis, and Federalizing Everyday Crime
How does this compare to the problem of the expansion of federal
criminal law? There are federal morals offenses, most notably the Mann
Act,63 which originally made it a federal crime to take a woman or girl
across state lines for either prostitution or private sexual immorality.64
There are also silly federal offenses covering conduct that probably should
not be a crime, such as unauthorized use of the image of “Smokey Bear”65
or the name or insignia “4-H Club.”66 But the far more serious problem is
the extension of federal law to encompass offenses that are the staples of
state criminal law enforcement. Federal criminal law now reaches not only

61. Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1 (quoting New Hampshire Senate Minority Leader
Robert Preston).
62. Meinzer, supra note 38, at 173-74 (quoting in part DONAL MACNAMARA & EDWARD
SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 187 (1977)).
63. White-slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2005)).
64. For a discussion of the evolution of the Mann Act, and its use to prosecute non
commercial sex cases, see DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE (1994). The current
version of the Mann Act makes it a federal crime to transport in interstate commerce (1) a
minor, with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution or prohibited sexual conduct that
will be commercially exploited, or (2) “any individual,” with the intent that the individual
engage in prostitution or “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2423 (2005). In states in which non-commercial sex
is no longer an offense, the reach of the Mann Act is apparently limited to prostitution or
other prohibited sexual conduct that is commercially exploited. Moreover, the United States
Attorneys’ Manual states that, except in cases in which “minors are victims,” prosecutions
under the Mann Act “should generally be limited to persons engaged in commercial
prostitution activities.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL
9-79.100 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. The provisions of the United
States Attorneys’ Manual are not intended to create rights, and are not enforceable. U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra, at 1-1.100 (“The Manual provides only internal Department
of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or
criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives
of the Department of Justice.”). Courts have consistently upheld this position. See, e.g.,
Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 751-52 (D. Colo. 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir.
1997) (holding that procedures in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s Death Penalty Protocol do
not provide defendant with a protectable interest); United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 493
(8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s express statement that it does not
create rights “puts criminal suspects and defendants on notice that they lack enforceable
rights in DOJ policies and procedures”).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2005) (punishing unauthorized use with fines and/or imprisonment
not exceeding six months). It is also a crime to use the image of “Woodsy Owl” without
authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 711a (2005).
66. Id. § 707.
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offenses that involve an obvious federal nexus—like tax fraud and fraud
that affects the sale of publicly traded securities—where federal
prosecution is the norm, but also many crimes traditionally prosecuted at
the state level. This includes crimes that at first blush seem exclusively
local in nature.
For example, James McFarland committed four armed robberies in Ft.
Worth, Texas, that netted him between $1,795 and $2,295.67 Under Texas
law (which is not known for leniency), his minimum sentence was five
years; although the maximum sentence was ninety-nine years, he would
have been eligible for parole after serving no more than thirty years.68 But
McFarland was not prosecuted under state law. Instead, he was prosecuted
under federal law for violating the Hobbs Act, which criminalizes robbery
or extortion affecting interstate commerce.69 Did his robberies affect
interstate commerce? Not much. None of the robberies were major, and,
in fact, McFarland stole only fifty dollars during one.70 But even a de
minimis impact on interstate commerce is sufficient to violate the Hobbs
Act. This de minimis impact can be shown by proving that the business
affected by the crime received some of its merchandise from out of state,
and that the crime caused a diminution of assets that resulted in the
business’ diminished ability to order additional out-of-state goods.71
McFarland’s conduct was held to meet that standard,72 and his conviction
was upheld after en banc review by the Fifth Circuit.73 McFarland’s
sentence for four counts of Hobbs Act robbery and four counts of using a
firearm in the commission of a robbery was 1,170 months, which is ninetyseven and one-half years.74 Federal law has no provision for parole. Even
if McFarland receives the maximum reduction for good behavior, he would

67. United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam),
aff’d by an equally divided en banc court, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002).
68. Id. at 558.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2005).
70. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558 (indicating that none of the four convenience store
robberies involved any physical injury to the victims and that the greatest amount of money
obtained from any one robbery was between $1,500 and $2,000).
71. See generally SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED
ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO § 15.3(B) (1998)
(discussing the depletion of assets theory of jurisdiction in the context of the Hobbs Act).
72. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558-59.
73. McFarland, 311 F.3d at 377 (affirming by an equally divided vote). In addition to a
one paragraph per curiam statement that affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction
and sentence, several dissenting opinions argued that the Hobbs Act, so interpreted, exceeds
the scope of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 377 (Garwood, J., dissenting); id. at 410
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit was also evenly divided on the same issue
in United States v. Hickman. 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Unlike
McFarland and the Curtis case discussed infra, Part II.B, Hickman involved a robbery that
left one victim dead. Id. at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
74. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558.
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have to serve eighty-five percent of that sentence.75 As the court noted, this
is in reality a life sentence without the possibility of parole.76
Andre Curtis committed eight armed robberies in Tulsa, Oklahoma
within a ten-day period (including robbing Mohawk Pizza two days in a
row).77 Almost all of the robberies were small time (one netted him twenty
dollars or less),78 but he did hit the jackpot twice, once at Fresh Kicks
where the proceeds amounted to $600, and once at an Express Mart where
the proceeds were estimated between $600 and $700.79 The total was no
more than $2,160, and the average per robbery was $270.80 No one was
injured, and no shots were fired, though Curtis had a gun. His total
sentence for eight counts of Hobbs Act robbery and eight counts of using a
firearm was 2,271 months, which is more than 189 years.81 Like
McFarland (and every other federal defendant), Curtis will have to serve at
least eighty-five percent of that sentence, which is a little more than 160
years.
The majority of armed robbers are, and will continue to be, prosecuted
under state rather than federal law,82 and accordingly their sentences are
much less than those imposed on McFarland and Curtis. The disparity in
treatment of McFarland and Curtis compared to others who committed
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2005) (providing prisoners with a possible sentence
reduction of fifty-four days per year, provided the prisoner meets specified standards of
behavior).
76. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558.
77. United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1062 (10th Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 1061-62.
79. Id. at 1061.
80. See id. at 1061-62 (accounting for $100 at Convenient Food Mart, $600 at Fresh
Kicks, $350 at Quik Pick, $65 at Super Trip, up to $700 at Express Mart, up to $95 at
Mohawk Pizza—in the course of two separate robberies—and up to $250 from Mike’s
Grocery, including goods from several of the business valuing several hundred dollars).
81. Id. at 1061.
82. Compare SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Tables 5.44, 5.48
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 30th ed. 2002) (accounting for 36,800 felony
robbery convictions in state courts in 2000, with a median incarceration sentence of eightytwo months and a median probation sentence of fifty-two months), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t544.pdf,
http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t548.pdf, with 2000 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
SOURCEBOOK FED. SENTENCING STATISTICS Tables 3, 13 (accounting for 1,721 robbery
convictions in the federal courts in FY2000, with a mean federal incarceration sentence of
108.1
months
and
no
probation),
available
at
http://www.ussc.
gov/ANNRPT/2000/table3.pdf, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table13.pdf.
As demonstrated by the McFarland and Curtis cases, the sentences in cases of multiple
robbery counts with firearms escalate exponentially, because federal law provides for
mandatory consecutive penalties for the use of weapons. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2005).
A second or subsequent offense of using a firearm in the commission of a violent felony is
punishable by a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, which must be imposed
consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2005). See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended
Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down The Commerce Clause and
Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1668 (2002) (discussing how Congress
has repeatedly increased the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) since 1968).
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similar acts, like the disparity in treatment of the few individuals singled
out for prosecution under morals offenses, is the inevitable result of
overfederalization (or, in the terms of this symposium,
overcriminalization). As noted above, there are an estimated 4,000 federal
crimes,83 many of which are very broad and cover conduct that is already a
crime under state law. Given the relatively small size of the federal courts
(which can prosecute only about five percent of the felonies in the United
States),84 the plethora of broad federal criminal laws cannot and will not be
employed in the majority of cases that fall within their terms. Rather, the
bulk of the cases that fall within the terms of most federal criminal statutes
will be prosecuted under state laws that cover much of the same ground.
For example, even in the case of drug offenses—which have been the focus
of sustained federal enforcement—less than two percent of those arrested
are prosecuted in federal court.85 The differences between state law and
federal law, however, are great. The Hobbs Act cases noted above
exemplify one key difference: federal sentences are now generally harsher
than state sentences for the same conduct. Accordingly, when only a few
robbery (or bribery, or drug, or carjacking) cases are prosecuted in federal
rather than state court, defendants prosecuted under federal law generally
receive a much harsher sentence than others who committed precisely the
same crimes but are prosecuted under state law.86
This extreme sentencing disparity is not grounds for relief. The federal
courts have repeatedly held that proof that many other defendants have not
been prosecuted for the same conduct, or were prosecuted in state rather
than federal court, or received very different sentences, provides no basis
for relief—unless a defendant can prove unconstitutional motivation based
on race, religion, or national origin.87 Every federal circuit has ruled that
83. See supra text accompanying note 15.
84. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 19.
85. See id. at 20 (analyzing data from fiscal year 1997, when approximately 1.5% of the
more than one million drug arrests led to federal prosecutions).
86. See Beale, supra note 4, at 998-99 (noting federal sentences are generally higher,
and in some instances ten to twenty times higher than state sentences for the same conduct).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that
federal and state sentencing disparity does not justify downward departure); United States v.
Searcy, 132 F.3d 1421, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a downward departure cannot be
based on the fact that the defendant might have received a lower sentence if prosecuted in
state court); United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting an
argument that departure could be based upon prosecutor’s choice to bring charges in federal
forum with harsher penalties, and noting that acceptance of such arguments would make
federal sentences vary in different states and undermine Congress’s intention to achieve
uniformity in federal sentencing); United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 961-62 (9th Cir.
1992) (asserting that departure is not justified by disparities between federal and state
sentences). Although the federal courts have recognized that prosecutorial discretion is
subject to judicial review if a defendant can demonstrate discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, or some other suspect classification, the defendant bears a heavy burden in
demonstrating that such discrimination occurred. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
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disparity is neither a basis for dismissal nor a basis for a challenge to a
sentence that exceeds the sentences imposed on co-defendants or others
who committed similar crimes.88 This is true even in extreme cases, such
as two brothers who were involved in the same cocaine transaction.89
Federal prosecutors dismissed the charges against one defendant, who was
prosecuted in state court and sentenced to probation plus the time he had
already served while awaiting trial.90 In light of that lenient sentence, the
federal judge who sentenced his brother thought it would be appropriate to
depart downward from the federal guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-one
months; he reduced the federal defendant’s sentence to thirteen months.91
The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing,
ruling that the trial court had no authority to reduce the federal defendant’s
sentence to bring it closer to the state sentence imposed on the other
participant in the transaction.92
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision
holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only93 opens an avenue
for defendants to reframe this issue, and seek sentences that are outside the
Guidelines in cases in which co-defendants or others similarly situated
have received more lenient sentences than those dictated by the guidelines.
It is too soon to say how receptive courts will be to such arguments. The
early cases indicate a wide range of approaches.94
456, 465, 470 (1996) (holding that a defendant seeking discovery to help establish a claim
of selective prosecution based upon race must produce credible evidence that similarly
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not, and finding the
study proffered by defendant insufficient).
88. E.g., United States v. Buckendahl, 251 F.3d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v.
Wong, 127 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1997); accord United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 52, 57 (1st
Cir. 2000); United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 153 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 709-10 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d
512 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Ives, 984 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 571, 584 (6th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Meza, 127 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v.
Armenta-Castro, 227 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gallegos, 129 F.3d
1140 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 812 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Willis, 139 F.3d at 811-12.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 811.
92. Id. at 812. The court apparently regarded the issue as an easy one: after placing the
case on the non-argument calendar, it decided the case with a brief per curiam opinion. Id.
at 811.
93. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the mandatory
guidelines increased a defendant’s sentence beyond the range established by the jury’s
verdict or the defendant’s guilty plea in violation of the right to trial by jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and concluding that the statutory provisions making the
guidelines mandatory would be excised, making the guidelines advisory).
94. Compare United States v. Jaber, 2005 WL 605787 (D. Mass. 2005) (concluding that
an out-of-guidelines adjustment was justified in order to bring defendant Jaber’s sentence
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C. The Common Vices of Both Morals Legislation and Overbroad
Federal Criminal Law
As these examples demonstrate, overbroad federal criminal laws—even
those that deal with violent conduct that should certainly be a crime—share
important characteristics with outdated morals laws. First and foremost,
both give enforcement authorities far too much unchecked discretion to
select those few cases that will actually be prosecuted. This problem arises
in the case of morals legislation that covers something that (almost)
everybody does. The relative ease of bringing such charges when the
prosecutor (or a private party) has another agenda brings to mind the
loitering statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court in Papachristou95 and
Kolender.96 Those statutes were so broad that they were applicable to
almost any conduct. Thus they allowed authorities to (in the words of
Capt. Louis Renault in Casablanca) “round up the usual suspects”
whenever they wished.97 The suspects who are prosecuted for morals
charges generally have no defense: they are guilty of the charged conduct,
but so are many of their friends and neighbors. In the case of broad federal
crimes that duplicate more widely enforced state laws, the problem is that
the enforcement is, in effect, a mile wide and an inch deep. Only a few
cases of the many can be chosen, and though these defendants deserve
criminal punishment, they are singled out for much harsher treatment than
others who have engaged in precisely the same conduct. Even assuming
that the selection of cases is not tinged with any bias, prejudice, or other
improper factor, the predictable and inevitable disparity in sentencing is
deeply problematic. It is the rough equivalent of a penal lottery, where a
few unlucky individuals “win” a far harsher term than their fellows.98 This
into line with the sentences imposed on other more culpable participants in pseudoephedrine
scheme), with United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding that
except in most exceptional cases district courts should sentence within the guidelines in
order, inter alia, to prevent disparity); United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D.
Utah 2005) (same).
95. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
97. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (rejecting a statute for failing to
provide sufficient notice to citizens regarding how to avoid prosecution under the statute);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (voiding a municipal
vagrancy statute for vagueness because it promoted abuse of prosecutorial discretion).
98. Rudolph Guiliani=s policies when he was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York provide an unusually clear example of such a random “lottery” effect. Guiliani
instituted “federal day,@ one day chosen at random each week in which all street-level drug
dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prosecuted in federal court. Alexander
Stille, A Dynamic Prosecutor Captures the Headlines, NAT’L L.J., June 17, 1985, at 48. The
“federal day” program was initiated in 1983. See Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War
on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at A1. Giuliani
stated that “[t]he idea was . . . ‘to create a Russian-roulette effect.’” Stille, supra, at 48.
Giuliani referred frequently to this program in his later political campaigns, asserting that it
kept drug dealers off balance because they never knew when they might be subject to the
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predictable structural disparity is fundamentally incompatible with the
underlying purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,99 which
reformed federal sentencing to avoid disparity in sentencing that was not
justified by differences in the offenders’ criminal history or offensive
conduct.100
1.

Other values and rights threatened by morals offenses
In addition to granting prosecutors enormous—even excessive—
discretion and creating unjustified disparity among similarly situated
defendants, overcriminalization undermines other significant values and
evades a variety of procedural protections. The content of morals charges
raises constitutional and policy questions. Laws regulating sexual practices
may be challenged on the grounds that they conflict with aspects of
constitutionally-protected liberty or violate equal protection.101 Laws
regulating the propriety of speech, prohibiting blasphemy, swearing, and
cursing,102 seem to be in direct conflict with the First Amendment.
Moreover, morals charges, like other consensual offenses, encourage
enforcement techniques that threaten privacy interests.103 These techniques
have included setting up surveillance of public restrooms and other sites
where police anticipate that gay men might meet, and using undercover
agents and informants to lure individuals into compromising situations.104
higher penalties associated with federal prosecutions. William Glaberson, Giuliani’s
Powerful Image Under Campaign Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1989, at A1. Mayor Ed
Koch identified another effect of this program: drug dealers who were arrested by local
authorities asked whether this was “federal day” and, if so, tried to escape. Josh Barbanel,
Koch Recommends Stiffer Penalties and More Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1985, at A1.
99. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C. (1984)). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides that one of the factors
to be considered in imposing federal sentences is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.” § 212, 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988)).
100. For a more extended discussion of the incompatibility between prosecutorial
policies that single out a few cases for harsher penalties in the federal system than similar
cases that remain in the state system, see Beale, supra note 4, at 1002-04.
101. Contemporary challenges would probably be based on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), but it has been suggested that they could also be based upon the Eighth
Amendment. See Falco, supra note 11, at 733-54 (asserting that challenges to imprisonment
for violations of sexual practice regulations could be grounded on the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
102. See supra note 6 (listing several state statutes regulating forms of speech).
103. Kadish, supra note 1, at 159-65.
104. The sting operation that led to the conviction of former D.C. mayor Marion Barry
had a flavor of this kind of investigative technique. Working with the police and
prosecutors, Barry=s former lover lured him to a hotel room where he was filmed smoking
cocaine. Critics charged that the lover turned informant played on Barry=s sexual interest
to convince him to use cocaine. See, e.g., Jill Nelson, Barry’s ‘Delilah’ Enthralls Court
With Details of Sex, Drugs, WASH. POST, June 28, 1990, at A38; Michael York, Moore
Testifies She Exceeded FBI Rules; ‘I Was There for a Purpose,’ Informer Says, WASH.
POST, June 30, 1990, at A1; Tracy Thompson & Michael York, Moore, Mundy Spar Over
Barry’s Intents at Vista; Barry’s Lawyer Hammers at Moore’s Credibility, Behavior During
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Moreover, as noted above, the addition of morals charges, such as
fornication, can effectively deprive the defendant of the ability to test the
validity of more serious charges, such as rape.105 The rights to a trial by
jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt mean little to a defendant whose
defense that sex was consensual is an admission of the lesser included
offense of fornication. Indeed, the wholly pretextual nature of fornication
charges is clear from the fact that prosecutors never charge the rape
“victim” with this offense.
2.

Other values and rights threatened by overfederalization
Like morals offenses, the overbroad body of federal criminal laws
threatens important substantive values and procedural protections, though
in ways less obvious than the occasional or pretextual prosecution of
vestigial morals offenses. One of the vices of overfederalization is that it
tips the federal-state balance, allowing federal and state prosecutors to
override state laws intended to protect state citizens and implement state
policies in cases that normally fall within the ambit of state enforcement.
This problem arises in a number of forms, including the nullification of
both state procedural protections for criminal defendants and other laws
expressing state policy. Overfederalization also increases the potential for
duplicative prosecutions and penalties, reduces political accountability,
and risks overwhelming the resources of the federal courts.
Federal laws provide defendants fewer procedural rights than the law in
many states. Indeed, a recent federal publication recommends federal
rather than state prosecution to evade a variety of protective state laws.106
These include a more powerful federal grand jury system in which
witnesses and potential defendants have fewer procedural rights, lower
standards for the approval of search warrants, a lower burden of proof to
justify a wire tap, and more restricted discovery of the government’s
case.107 Unlike state law, federal law also permits a conviction on the basis
Vista Sting, WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at A1; Charles C. Lemley, Editorial, The Barry Tape,
Yes and No, WASH. POST, July 4, 1990, at A18.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (describing the reticence of some
defendants charged with rape to assert that the encounter was consensual, where such an
assertion effectively admits fornication).
106. See MALCOLM L. RUSSELL-EINHORN, FIGHTING URBAN CRIME: THE EVOLUTION OF
FEDERAL-LOCAL COLLABORATION 3 (2003) (listing several aspects of prosecution that are
less restrictive on the government in the federal system, including the grand jury, discovery,
witness immunity, search warrants, preventive detention, electronic surveillance, and
accomplice testimony), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ pdffiles1/nij/197040.pdf.
107. Id. In United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992), the district court
dismissed an indictment charging narcotics offenses on the ground that the case had been
the product of a state investigation, and had been prosecuted in federal court “solely@ to
take advantage of less stringent federal rules concerning search warrants, wire surveillance,
and informants. The court of appeals reversed, agreeing that the systematic transfer of
“state@ cases to federal court is a legitimate source of concern for the courts, but holding
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of an accomplice’s uncorroborated testimony.108 In effect, concurrent
federal and state criminal jurisdiction enables prosecutorial forum shopping
to get the most favorable procedural and substantive rules. This raises an
issue of some importance. In a federal system, should federal law be used
to give prosecutors an easy means of circumventing the policies reflected in
state laws favorable to the defense? Some of these laws reflect values
extrinsic to the truth seeking process (such as a respect for individual
privacy). Others—such as the rules prohibiting convictions based solely on
the testimony of an accomplice—reflect procedures deemed necessary to
ensure the reliability of a finding of guilt. When federal law largely if not
completely duplicates state law, these state policies can be overridden at
the prosecutors’ whim by pulling a case with no special federal
characteristics out of the state system and into federal court.
Federal criminal laws also provide a way to override other state policy
choices, such as the choice of the agency or program that receives the
proceeds of forfeitures.109 North Carolina, for example, provides that the
proceeds of forfeitures go to support education.110 Federal law, in contrast,
returns forfeited funds to the investigative and prosecutorial agencies that
developed the case for forfeiture.111 State and local investigators and
prosecutors who develop a case for forfeiture can take it to federal officials.
If the federal officials adopt the forfeiture, the state officials will receive
the funds to support their budgets, bypassing the North Carolina
legislature’s preference that the funds go to education. This not only
thwarts North Carolina’s policy decision to prefer education, it also
deprives the state of the most effective means of ensuring that financial
motives do not distort criminal enforcement decisions.112 Similarly,
that the courts have no authority to interfere with the executive=s discretionary power to
control criminal prosecutions. Id. at 954-55.
108. RUSSEL-EINHORN, supra note 106, at 3.
109. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law,
or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1278 (2000) (observing that state
officials often pass seized property to federal officials in an effort to circumvent the
deliberate policy choices of state legislatures, and questioning whether this policy is
consistent with the state officials’ duties under state law); see also Karen Dillon, Taking
Cash Into Custody: A Special Report on Police and Drug Money Seizures, KAN. CITY STAR,
May 21-22, 2000, at A1 (detailing, in a series of articles published over two days, the
evasion of state law by federal forfeiture statutes), available at http://www.kcstar.com
/projects/drugforfeit/index.html.
110. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (requiring the proceeds of forfeitures to be “used
exclusively for maintaining free public schools”).
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e) (2005) (permitting the Attorney General the authority to
transfer forfeited property to, among other options, “any State or local law enforcement
agency which participated directly in any of the acts which led to the seizure or forfeiture of
the property”).
112. For a powerful argument that the actual and potential revenues from forfeiture
create economic incentives that are distorting law enforcement and producing self financing,
unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from meaningful legislative oversight,
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employing federal rather than state forfeiture can be a means of evading
state laws intended to protect certain kinds of property from forfeiture.113
Federal criminal laws provide a way to override state laws that do not
authorize capital punishment.114 Moreover, the decision whether to ask for
the death penalty is not made by the prosecutors in the local U.S.
Attorney’s Office but instead by a committee in Main Justice.115 Although
this procedure is intended to ensure that federal law is enforced according
to the same standards nationwide, it has the effect of overriding the choice
of voters in states that have not authorized capital punishment. This is, of
course, more problematic the more attenuated the federal nexus, and the
more infrequent federal prosecutions for similar behavior.
The expanding overlap of federal and state law also increases the
potential for duplicative prosecutions and penalties for the same conduct,
which are not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy clause.116 Even an
acquittal on the same allegations in state court will not prevent a
subsequent federal prosecution.117 Although the availability of a later
see Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1998).
113. State laws generally exempt one’s residence, and many states exempt other
property, such as the tools of the trade necessary to earn one’s living. See Karen Dillon,
Many States Have Put Safeguards in Place to Protect Residents from Loss of Homes, KAN.
CITY STAR, May 21, 2000, at A14 (observing the practice in several states of avoiding state
laws that generally exempt one’s residence and other property from forfeiture by handing
the property over to the federal authorities).
114. Congress extended the federal death penalty to forty offenses in 1994, and
subsequently added others. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and
Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 349-50
(1999).
115. See id. at 407-31 (providing an overview of how the Capital Case Review
Committee should work, as well as a personal account from a former member of that
committee on how it operates in practice).
116. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS ENFORCEMENT 663-65 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the relationship between the expansion
of concurrent jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy); William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty,
Federalism and National Criminal Law: Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the
Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1740 (1989) (discussing tension
between the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction and the values of the Double
Jeopardy clause).
117. The Double Jeopardy clause is subject to the “dual sovereignty” limitation, which
treats the states and federal government as separate sovereigns for Double Jeopardy
purposes. Accordingly, the prior prosecution by a different sovereign does not constitute
Double Jeopardy. The Supreme Court laid the foundation for this doctrine in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), and it
reiterated and extended it in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). In general, scholars
have been critical of the doctrine. See, e.g., Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns:
The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (1992) (contending that the dual sovereignty doctrine is no longer viable,
because now state and federal law enforcement officials work together and cooperate in
dealing with crime—they are not two independent sovereigns pursuing independent goals);
Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 282 (1992) (arguing that the dual sovereignty
doctrine undermines the sovereignty of the people since the Double Jeopardy Clause should
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federal prosecution might be desirable in the case of civil rights offenses
(where there has always been some suspicion about the zeal with which the
states may prosecute),118 should it be possible for federal prosecutors to
have a second bite of the apple in routine cases?119
Another troubling consequence of the expansion of federal law is a
decrease in accountability for criminal justice policies. For example, the
2004 election included a hotly contested California referendum on the
state’s harsh three strikes law.120 It is far less likely, however, that voters
nationwide could or would focus on the possibility of occasional Hobbs
Act prosecutions like those in McFarland and Curtis.
The increasing number of federal prosecutions also threatens to
overwhelm the capacity of the relatively small federal court system,

be viewed as implementing the principal of popular sovereignty); Susan N. Herman, Double
Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 609, 618-19 n.32 (1994) (collecting and digesting a dozen articles which illustrate that
the commentators on the dual sovereignty doctrine are nearly uniform in their criticism for
the doctrine); Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995) (examining the Double Jeopardy issues surrounding
the Rodney King case and proposing a new way to look at the dual sovereignty doctrine so
that it will only be used to provide a check on state governments when prosecuting state
officials or when state juries are manipulated through race-based peremptory challenges);
Kevin J. Hellman, Note, The Fallacy of Dueling Sovereignties: Why the Supreme Court
Refuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 153-55 (1994)
(arguing that the dual sovereignty doctrine is poor public policy because it encourages
vindictive prosecutions, diminishes public faith in the judicial system, and denigrates
defendants’ rights).
118. The federal civil rights prosecution of the highway patrolmen who beat motorist
Rodney King has been justified on this basis. For a discussion of a civil rights exception to
dual sovereignty, see Herman, supra note 117, at 632-39; Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy
Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights “Exception,” 41 UCLA L. REV. 649, 661-66, 669-71
(1994); Robert Matz, Note, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If At First
You Don’t Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 376 (1997).
119. Since the Supreme Court’s articulation of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the
Department of Justice has carefully limited the cases in which it brings successive
prosecutions, requiring each case to meet a list of criteria and to be approved by a senior
department official. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 64, at 9-2.031 (codifying
the criteria for the U.S. Attorneys Office to decide when to bring successive prosecutions
under a policy called the “Petite Policy”); see also Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg,
Dual Prosecutions: A Model For Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 75-77 (1996) (outlining the Petite Policy, how it functions, and how it
is enforced). But see Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 177-81 (2004) (concluding
that Petite Policy’s usefulness is limited because Department of Justice often fails to abide
by the policy and courts have consistently refused to enforce the policy).
120. See Joe Mathews, How Prospects for Prop. 66 Fell So Far, So Fast: Three-Strikes
Revamp Looked Likely Till Pete Wilson, the Governor and a Billionaire Joined to Defeat It,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B1 (discussing the critical role of Governor Schwarzenegger
and former Governor Wilson in narrowly defeating this amendment, which was supported
by sixty-two percent of voters only two weeks before the two men joined forces); Dan
Walters, Voter Turnaround on Proposition 66 was a Dramatic Campaign Event,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 2004, at A3 (describing the heavy campaigning, media blitz,
and massive campaign funding that led to defeat of a measure that would have weakened the
state’s tough three-strikes law that originally was favored by three quarters of state voters).
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endangering its capacity to fulfill its other functions, such as the
enforcement of federal constitutional and statutory rights.121 Because of the
Speedy Trial Act,122 criminal cases go to the front of the queue for trial,123
making it difficult in many districts to bring civil cases to trial. Despite
increases in the total number of cases filed,124 the number of civil trials in
the federal system has been plummeting, declining from more than 12,000
in 1988 to less than 6,000 in 2003.125 In contrast, the number of criminal
trials has held roughly steady.126 Indeed, since 2001 the number of
criminal trials has exceeded the number of civil trials each year.127
Although these statistics doubtless reflect other factors as well, the
expansion of the criminal docket clearly consumes resources that would
otherwise be available for civil cases.
3.

Why politics leads to retaining morals offenses and adding new federal
crimes
Morals and overbroad and unnecessary federal crimes share one other
common feature. They exist and persist, at least in part, because of
weaknesses in the political process. The following paragraphs help explain
why outdated morals statutes stay on the books and the scope of federal
criminal jurisdiction has expanded so dramatically, with no end in sight,
and why both pose a real danger.
Cognitive errors and biases tend to support a one way ratchet toward the
enactment of additional crimes and harsher penalties. These include
overgeneralization, availability, overconfidence, and biased processing of
information. These errors and biases lead people to recall media accounts
of serious crimes, to overestimate their frequency, and to jump to the
conclusion that additional harsher laws are needed.128 These flames are
121. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 46-48 (1996) (explaining the increase
in federal caseload and the shifting of resources from civil to criminal cases).
122. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3152-3174 (2004)). See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2004) (requiring that criminal trials to
begin within seventy days of an indictment or initial appearance if there is a not guilty plea).
123. Indeed, FED. R. CRIM. P. 50 provides that “[s]cheduling preference must be given to
criminal proceedings as far as practicable.”
124. See Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.1: Total Civil and Criminal Cases Filed,
Terminated, Pending (Includes Transfers) (listing the total number of criminal and civil
cases filed in U.S. District Courts on an annual basis from 1960-2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table4.01.pdf.
125. See Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.3: Civil and Criminal Trials Completed
(showing the total number of completed federal civil cases plummet from 12,388 in 1988 to
5,830 in 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/ table4.03.pdf.
126. Id. (showing that the total number of completed federal criminal cases stayed fairly
stable with 7,576 in 1988 and 7,118 in 2003).
127. Id.
128. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
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fanned by the news media, which has an economic incentive to portray
violent crime in news programming as well as entertainment
programming.129 In short, there is a “fear factor” affecting criminal justice
policy.
Vestigial morals legislation also reflects the difficulty of getting
something out of the criminal code once it is in. Legislators are concerned
(and rightly so) that the public may conflate their support of
decriminalization with support for the conduct in question.130 No one
wants to run against an opponent who can point to a vote that seems to
endorse adultery or fornication, especially at a time when moral values can
dominate an election.131 Ironically, this problem is especially great when
the provision in question is seldom used. In that situation, repeal is not a
high priority for anyone, so there is little to be gained in supporting it.132
Overfederalization may reflect a bit of inertia, but it also reflects the
problem of a (relatively) free lunch. It sounds good to voters to pass new
criminal laws or harsher sentences,133 but at the state level eventually you
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 57-60 (1997) (outlining cognitive errors and
describing generally how these errors alter and bias public perceptions).
129. See Sara Sun Beale, Selling Fear: The News Media’s Coverage of Crime and Why
It Matters (manuscript on file with author).
130. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E8 (noting that some state legislators, considering
repealing laws that are no longer necessary for preventing criminal conduct, such as laws
criminalizing adultery, are “fearful that repeal would paint them as condoning immorality”).
One prosecution may not be enough to get people’s attention. After the Wisconsin
prosecution showed that adultery charges could, and might be brought, a state legislator,
who sought to repeal the provisions, was unable to get co-sponsors for his bill. Id.
131. Based upon polling data, some analysts and commentators concluded that moral
values played a large role in George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004. See, e.g., Dana Milbank,
Deeply Divided Country Is United in Anxiety, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A28 (citing a
Republican pollster who suggested that the number of voters listing “moral values” as a top
issue in voting and “the passage of ballot initiatives against same-sex marriage, proved that
values have replaced pocketbook issues ‘as the primary political cleavage’ splitting secular
Democrats from churchgoing Republicans”); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “Values” Help Shape
Bush
Re-Election,
FOXNEWS.COM
(Nov.
4,
2004),
at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137535,00. html (on file with the American
University Law Review) (concluding that, based on different polling results, it was “Bush’s
strong grip on the issue of morality and faith, and his outreach to religious voters” that
helped him to win the 2004 election). But see, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Liberal Christians
Challenge “Values Vote,” WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at A10 (challenging the idea that
support for “moral values” on Election Day was a nod toward only conservative or
Republican issues by citing a post-election poll that showed sixty-four percent of voters
think the most urgent moral problems are more traditionally Democrat issues such as “greed
and materialism” and “poverty and economic justice”); MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA,
MEDIA OVERPLAYED “MORAL VALUES” AS “DECISIVE” ELECTION ISSUE (Nov. 10, 2004), at
http://mediamatters.org/ items/200411100010 (on file with the American University Law
Review) (contrasting the statements of different major news media commentators and
concluding that the idea of “moral values” was too vague and “inept” to provide any kind of
useful information).
132. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E8 (noting that state legislators are loathe to alienate
constituents for whom morality is an important issue when they think that no one is being
prosecuted).
133. For a general discussion of the political forces driving punitive crime policies, see
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must pay for them. Most states are required to balance their budgets,134 and
criminal justice is such a large budgetary chunk that it competes in a real
sense with other high priorities (education, roads, salaries for state
employees, etc.).135 The budget crises many states have faced in recent
years have led some state legislators to rethink punitive policies.136 At the
federal level, however, deficit spending is a way of life,137 and the criminal
justice budget is just a drop in a very large federal budgetary bucket.138 So
Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001).
134. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 7-9 (1996) (arguing that the claims that forty-nine of the
states have some constitutional or statutory requirement for balanced budgets is too
simplistic since the enforcement mechanisms vary considerably between them). Only
thirty-one states actually require legislatures to pass a balanced budget, as opposed to
requiring the governor to submit one to the legislature, and some of these provisions have no
enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 10. At least twenty states allow budget deficits to carry
over year to year or allow deficit borrowing. Id.
135. See Beale, supra note 133, at 435-36 (concluding that budget shortfalls have forced
states to think about cutting the punitive criminal justice policies because of the high cost of
the criminal justice system in light of the rising incarceration numbers).
136. In the broader context of criminal justice, state budgetary pressures are now
creating pressures to rethink punitive approaches. By the midpoint of 2002, many states
were in serious financial difficulty; estimates of the total state budget shortfall for fiscal year
2002 ranged from $27 billion to $38 billion. Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is
the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED.
SENT. REP. 41, 41 (2002). One response to the budget shortfalls has been to reduce
sentences and to repeal or limit mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which are now
perceived as unnecessarily harsh and fiscally onerous. As one state correctional official
observed, “’budget problems are making people ask fundamental questions about whether
we can afford to keep doing what we’ve been doing.’” Fox Butterfield, Tight Budgets Force
States to Reconsider Crime and Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A1, A11; Wilhelm
and Turner identify thirteen states that modified their harsh sentencing laws in 2001 and
2002, and others with similar proposals under consideration. Id. at 6 Fig. 2. Many of the
legislative changes occurred in states led by Republicans, and Republican governors in other
states closed prisons as a cost-cutting measure. Judith Greene & Vincent Schiraldi, Cutting
Prison Costs is Tempting In a Time of Fiscal Crisis, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Feb. 27,
2002, at B9. Some states that once led the way on harsh sentencing laws are now seeking
ways to cut their costs by measures that include reducing incarceration. For example,
Louisiana, which has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the nation, enacted
legislation cutting many drug sentences in half and eliminating mandatory sentences for
certain non-violent crimes. Id. at 5. The legislature also limited the application of the state
three strikes law. Id. It was estimated that the state will save $60 million in prison
operating funds. Id. See also Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing,
forthcoming
105
COLUM.
L.
REV.,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=698563 (analyzing effect of state budget
problems on willingness to reconsider harsh sentencing laws); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough
on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413.
137. According to the Office of Management and Budget, since 1900, there have been
seventy-one years in which the federal government has run at a deficit. See Office of Mgmt.
and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1-1: Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or
Deficits
(-):
1789-2010,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2006/sheets/hist01 z1.xls (count of years in which combined on and off budget
accounts are in balance or surplus). In fact, since 1950, there have been only nine years in
which the government has not run a deficit. Id.
138. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
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there is virtually no real fiscal incentive to rein in federal legislators who
capitalize on the public’s fear of crime.
D. The Proper Scope of the Federal System: Breadth Versus Depth and
the Disparity Critique
The inevitable severe disparity that results from federal prosecution is
most troubling when federal law is thinly enforced, leaving the vast
majority of cases for state prosecution. Moreover, federal prosecution is
troubling when there is no clear line differentiating the cases chosen for
federal prosecution from those chosen for state prosecution. Although
concerns regarding the propriety of overriding various state policy choices
still remain, many of the vices of overfederalization will be reduced or
eliminated if federal enforcement becomes the norm for a category of
cases, even if that category is one that has not traditionally been treated as a
federal crime.
How does this play out in the context of violent crimes, like the armed
robberies in McFarland and Curtis? There is considerable popular support
for the federal government playing an important role in the response to
violent crime, and one of the Department of Justice’s most important goals
as stated in its fiscal year 2004 strategic plan is reducing the threat,
incidence and prevalence of violent crime, especially as it stems from
illegal use of guns or from organized criminal enterprises.139 The
Department’s Project Safe Neighborhoods program seeks to implement this
goal by requiring each United States Attorney to develop a comprehensive
gun violence program, drawing together federal, state, and local
agencies.140 To some degree the propriety of that policy depends on an
assessment of the outer limits of the Commerce Clause power,141 a topic
YEAR 2004, 195, 311 (showing that the federal prison system in 2002 accounted for only
$4,617 million of the $2,011 billion federal budget and was estimated to account for only
$4,492 million of the projected $2,229 billion budget in 2004), at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/budget.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
139. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE REPORT &
FISCAL YEAR 2003 REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2004 PERFORMANCE
PLAN (identifying the Department’s first strategic goal as protecting the U.S. against
terrorism, and the second goal as enforcing federal criminal laws, including as goal 2.1
reducing
violent
crime),
available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/
pr2002/TableofContents.htm.
140. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ABOUT PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, at
http://www.projectsafeneighborhoods.gov/about.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with
the American University Law Review) (providing an overview of the purpose and essential
elements of Project Safe Neighborhood as well as a portal for its extensive website
describing all of the project’s elements).
141. In the case of the Hobbs Act and other existing legislation, this is a debatable
assumption. See supra note 73 (discussing the Hickman and McFarland cases and noting
that the Fifth Circuit was evenly divided on the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act), and
John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the
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beyond the scope of this Essay. Assuming arguendo that any legislation
being enforced rests on a sufficient basis in the Commerce Clause or other
delegated powers, the disparity concerns noted above could be addressed
by defining—administratively or by statute—the criteria for federal
prosecution,142 and by more rather than fewer federal prosecutions of some
kinds of cases. A general norm of prosecution for a class of cases that falls
within the federal government’s delegated powers means that all offenders
within that class will be treated consistently, both in terms of sentencing
and in terms of various procedural rights. Within the ambit of the national
government’s constitutional powers, the policy choice of designating the
classes of cases that call for such a commitment of federal resources—
which would effectively supplant state enforcement—is committed to
Congress and the executive branch. However, given the severely limited
resources of both federal prosecutors and the federal courts, the strategy of
criminalizing nearly everything and leaving enforcement to case-by-case
decision-making produces the problems described in this Essay. Moreover,
assuming that all federal prosecutions continue to be brought in the federal
courts, the small size of the federal court system means that for the
foreseeable future the number of federal prosecutions is subject to severe
limitations. It would simply not be possible, for example, to bring all of the
current drug prosecutions arising from more than one million arrests each
year throughout the United States into the federal courts.143
Present and former prosecutors defend the present concurrent system as
one that provides a federal backstop for particular cases in which federal
resources are necessary for an effective prosecution of conduct in the
interests of public safety. They argue that prosecutorial discretion—
channeled by the priorities set by the Department of Justice and adapted to
the conditions in different judicial districts—is the best means of protecting
the public.144 A general policy of prosecuting violent offenders whenever
Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 563 (2005).
142. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70
SO. CAL. L. REV. 643, 707-18 (1997) (proposing adoption of administrative guidelines,
subject to judicial review, requiring each U.S. Attorney’s office to develop and consistently
apply internal classification schemes using characteristics of offenders and crimes to
determine which cases will be prosecuted as federal crimes).
143. See supra note 85 (discussing drug arrests for fiscal year 1997 of which less than
two percent were prosecuted in federal courts).
144. See, e.g., Jamie S. Gorelik & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 976 (1995) (arguing that prosecutorial
discretion at the federal level can effectively address Congress’s intent in federalizing
crimes by only taking those cases where federal prosecution has some degree of
comparative advantage to local or state prosecution); Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking
Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
573, 575-76 (1999) (arguing that federal prosecutors are uniquely positioned where they can
use their prosecutorial discretion to choose cases not just for the particular cases, but rather
in a strategic effort to effectively reduce crime); Litman & Greenberg, supra note 119, at
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they fall within the reach of the federal gun laws—like the earlier
Triggerlock program and Project Safe Neighborhoods—can be defended on
this ground. Such a general policy of federal prosecution responds to the
disparity critique as long as the basis for federal jurisdiction maps well
enough onto the offense conduct that the prosecutorial initiative captures
most of the cases, rather than a random few.145 But there is a practical
problem. The number of crimes involving handguns far exceeds the
capacity of the federal courts now and in the foreseeable future.146
Cases like McFarland and Curtis, however, suggest that prosecutorial
discretion as presently administered does not solve many of the issues
raised in this Essay. Indeed, neither case seems consistent with the United
States Attorneys’ Manual, which instructs federal prosecutors that Hobbs
Act robbery “is to be utilized only in instances involving organized crime,
gang activity, or wide-ranging schemes.”147 It does not appear that either
case represented a general policy or bringing all similar cases within the
federal system, even within those judicial districts.
E. What Does This Have To Do With Mattress Tags?
Does the preceding analysis of these two forms of overcriminalization
have any bearing on the issue of what might be called “mattress tag”
offenses, the regulatory offenses that many have argued are the paradigm

81-83 (contending that it was in fact the intent of Congress to expand federal criminal
jurisdiction so that federal resources will be available in those few cases where a national
interest is at stake or where there is a need from the state, and to allow federal prosecutors to
use their discretion in choosing which cases to prosecute at the federal level).
145. In comparison, whether a telegram transmission between two points within a state
happens to get routed through an out of state connection is a chance occurrence that will
single out only a few randomly chosen cases. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 116, at 2223, 185 (discussing cases based on such jurisdictional accidents); see also Franklin E.
Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 22-23 (1996) (outlining a set of guidelines for
Congress to use when creating federal criminal statutes that would put criminal conduct
under federal jurisdiction). These guidelines would require a significant nexus between the
federal government and the criminal threat itself. Id. at 23. Under these principles, it would
be improper for chance occurrences such as carjacking or the above referenced telegram
transmission, both rather trivial connections to federal power, to provide an appropriate
basis for federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 25.
146. In 1994, critics estimated that the number of federal judges would have to be
quadrupled if Congress passed a bill extending federal jurisdiction to all crimes committed
with a gun that had crossed state lines. Beale, supra note 82, at 1649. Indeed, concern that
the federal courts would be swamped with high volume low prestige prosecutions for local
crimes of violence may have been one of the factors motivating the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See Beale, supra note 82, at 165060. By holding that Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting the Gun Free School
Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998 & Supp. V 1993), Lopez revived the
understanding that there is a judicially enforceable limit on Congress’s power to enact
criminal legislation based upon the Commerce Clause.
147. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 64, at 9-131.040.
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of overcriminalization?148 This is an issue that affects both the federal and
state systems. Indeed, there is evidence that many states are enacting more
public welfare/strict liability offenses, and other laws intended to make it
easier to prosecute corporations and/or corporate officers and employees.149
Also, existing laws have been employed to obtain convictions for relatively
minor conduct involving no more than negligence.150
The common themes noted above—excessive prosecutorial discretion,
disparity, potential for abuse and likelihood that other values will be
sacrificed—do not suggest an easy answer to the question whether some (or
most) regulatory offenses should be repealed, leaving the field for civil law
or good judgment. But these themes do suggest a series of additional
questions that would illuminate the debate about regulatory criminal
offenses, and might help to determine whether and when regulatory
offenses should be prosecuted. Here are some of the questions about
regulatory offenses that I would like to see explored.
Excessive prosecutorial discretion can clearly play a role in the case of
the most broadly worded statutes, especially those that allow strict liability
prosecutions. How big a part of the problem is this with regulatory
offenses? Was Arthur Anderson, for example, prosecuted criminally for
conduct that was relatively common? Two distinctive elements of
regulatory crime are (1) administrative regulations that supplement the
statutory regimes, defining with greater precision the meaning of the
statutory provisions, and the conduct that is proscribed and permitted, and
(2) administrative agencies that enforce the relevant laws and regulations.
The administrative regulations and the agencies enforcing them have the
potential to circumscribe prosecutorial discretion and reduce or largely
eliminate disparity. How successful are the various regulatory agencies,
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, in clarifying their statutory regimes, reducing areas of
148. See generally ROSENZWEIG, supra note 3 (contending that the enormous expansion
of the number of crimes through legislative action has led to punishment for actions that are
not in themselves wrong, but rather are prohibited only because of legislative decree),
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=44674.
149. See generally STATESIDE ASSOCIATES, 50 STATE CRIMINALIZATION ASSESSMENT
(Nov. 7, 2003) (on file with author) (finding that between 2000 and 2003, twenty-three
states have enacted or pending statutes creating new crimes, and twenty-six states have
expanded corporate criminal liability or exposure).
150. See, e.g., ROSENZWEIG, supra note 3, at 1-2 (describing United States v. Hanousek,
176 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2000), a case where a railroad manager was sentenced to six months
in prison for discharging pollutants due to the actions of an employee who accidentally
struck and ruptured an oil pipeline with construction equipment). But see Kathleen F.
Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Prosecutions, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077
(2001) (reviewing 140 hazardous waste prosecutions and concluding that contrary to claims
in the literature, prosecutions involved obviously illegal and often pervasive criminal
conduct, not isolated or inadvertent technical violations).
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uncertainty, and limiting the potential for prosecution? How does this
compare to state regulatory regimes (both the statutory and administrative
aspects)?
Much of my analysis hinges on disparity as a result of thin enforcement.
Are the statutes in question generally enforced? My impression is that the
answer is yes in at least some areas, such as the enforcement of the
securities laws by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Perhaps in
some contexts agency discretion can provide an important degree of
uniformity not present when prosecutorial discretion is exercised directly in
the dispersed offices of the United States Attorneys. Does the regulatory
aspect here mean that prosecutorial discretion is necessarily more regulated
and rational?
What about the potential for abuse and undermining other values? Here
the most significant issue may be the efforts to use Department of Justice
prosecutorial guidelines and the federal sentencing guidelines to limit
attorney client privilege, which are discussed by John Hasnas in Ethics and
the Problem of White Collar Crime.151
Unlike morals offenses and overfederalization, there seems to be no real
impediment in the political process related to regulatory offenses, or at
least not one biased toward overcriminalization. The potential defendants
in regulatory cases—corporate and business interests, regulated industries,
and individuals who run major corporations—have the resources and
sophistication to lobby effectively to protect their interests.152 Moreover, a
good deal of this conduct is very much below the political radar. This
might lend to support the view that regulatory offenses are not likely to be
subject to overcriminalization. Indeed, recent events suggest that we have
too little white collar crime enforcement, rather than too much. The widescale accounting scandals affecting major corporations such as Enron and
WorldCom are just the tip of the iceberg.153 Scandals involving a range of
criminal activity from fraud to health and safety violations have wracked
many industries, including energy, technology, health care,
pharmaceuticals, cruise lines, and insurance.154 However, the existence of
151. John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
579, 624-30 (2005).
152. Indeed, a public choice perspective begins from the premise that corporate interests
are so politically powerful that they will be able to avoid the forms of liability to which they
are most opposed. See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western
Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 89, 101-03 (2005). A comparative analysis suggests that corporate and business
interests (and other interest groups) are more politically powerful in the United States than
in Western Europe at the present time. Id. at 147-54 (exploring the influence of interest
groups in the U.S. and Europe in general and on the adoption of corporate criminal liability).
153. See id. at 90-96. Enron lost $100 billion in shareholder equity, and more than 6,500
employees lost their jobs and pensions. Id. at 91 & n.7.
154. Id.
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serious forms of white collar or regulatory crime that have gone largely
unchecked does not mean that some of the laws are not written too broadly,
nor does it mean all of the defendants who have been charged are properly
the subject of criminal sanctions. It does, however, suggest caution in
accepting at face value the claims of interest groups seeking to cut back on
the scope of criminal law and criminal enforcement in this context.
CONCLUSION
When someone says “overcriminalization,” the first thought that comes
to mind for many people is either morals legislation or a morass of
unnecessary laws regulating trivial everyday conduct. I have tried to show
that morals offenses continue to be a source of genuine concern, and that
they share many similarities with overfederalization, which, I argue, should
also be seen as a problem of overcriminalization. As the descriptions of
some individual cases indicate, it is easy to see the unfairness of both forms
of overcriminalization. I have also tried to show that there are more subtle
ways that both forms of overcriminalization conflict with other values and
eviscerate a variety of laws intended to provide procedural and substantive
protections. Although these problems are relatively easy to demonstrate,
they are far more difficult to remedy. There are structural features of our
psyches and our political system that tend to promote and entrench such
laws.
I would like to close this Essay by drawing attention to another pressing
problem in the United States that is related to but distinct from the
phenomenon of overcriminalization: our alarming rates of incarceration.
Figures from 2003 indicate that the U.S. rate of 714 incarcerated persons
per 100,000 is not merely the highest in the world, but it is orders of
magnitude higher than any other country to which we compare ourselves.155
Our rate is five times as high as any of the Western European
democracies,156 and greatly exceeds even our closest competitors, Belarus
and Russia.157 In the United States we impose incarceration more
frequently for the same offenses as do other Western nations, and we
impose longer terms of incarceration for the same offenses.158 Tragically,
155. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: RISING POPULATION
DESPITE FALLING CRIME RATES 4 (illustrating how, among the ten countries with the highest
incarceration rate, Russia is the only country that the United States would compare itself
with
and
their
rate
is
160
per
100,000
less),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf.
156. See id. at 5 (providing examples of incarceration rates in some countries commonly
thought of as peers with the United States such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, and India; these countries have incarceration rates
ranging from 29 per 100,000 to 141 per 100,000).
157. Id. at 4. The rates in Belarus and Russia per 100,000 are 554 and 548. Id.
158. See generally Beale, supra note 129 (manuscript on file with author).
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the same political, psychological, and media forces that promote
overcriminalization also promote excessive incarceration.

